Video Episodes:
1 Views
14:21:18 11/03/09
Steve Neuberg (2), 11/02/2009
[LESS INFO] 1 VIEWS | ADDED 19:21:18 11/03/09
Toward a Functional, Affordance-Centered Model of Person Perception, Prejudices, and Social Interaction: Taking into Account Life History and Ecological Considerations
Traditional psychological and social science theories fail to account for the complexity and nuance that characterize people's prejudices and the manner in which, more generally, people view and interact with one another. I am developing an alternative, functional, affordance-based model, one positing (1) that our views of others are based on our inferences about their goals, the behavioral strategies they employ to reach them, and the tangible threats and opportunities afforded us by those strategies, and (2) that these goal and strategy inferences are themselves heuristically inferred from others' life history standing (i.e., age X sex categorization) in combination with stereotypes about the behavioral strategies favored by the different physical and social ecologies in which people live (i.e., "ecology stereotypes"). This vertically integrative framework-linking life history and ecological considerations to person perception processes-provides a more compelling account for a wide range of psychological and social phenomena related to intergroup stereotypes and prejudices, within-coalition stereotypes and prejudices, various social-cognitive biases, and the general accuracy of person perception and stereotypes.
0 Views
14:12:26 11/03/09
Steve Neuberg (1), 11/02/2009
[LESS INFO] 0 VIEWS | ADDED 19:12:26 11/03/09
Toward a Functional, Affordance-Centered Model of Person Perception, Prejudices, and Social Interaction: Taking into Account Life History and Ecological Considerations
Traditional psychological and social science theories fail to account for the complexity and nuance that characterize people's prejudices and the manner in which, more generally, people view and interact with one another. I am developing an alternative, functional, affordance-based model, one positing (1) that our views of others are based on our inferences about their goals, the behavioral strategies they employ to reach them, and the tangible threats and opportunities afforded us by those strategies, and (2) that these goal and strategy inferences are themselves heuristically inferred from others' life history standing (i.e., age X sex categorization) in combination with stereotypes about the behavioral strategies favored by the different physical and social ecologies in which people live (i.e., "ecology stereotypes"). This vertically integrative framework-linking life history and ecological considerations to person perception processes-provides a more compelling account for a wide range of psychological and social phenomena related to intergroup stereotypes and prejudices, within-coalition stereotypes and prejudices, various social-cognitive biases, and the general accuracy of person perception and stereotypes.
8 Views
12:45:30 06/04/09
Athena Aktipis (2), 5/27/2009
[LESS INFO] 8 VIEWS | ADDED 16:45:30 06/04/09
Models such as Maynard Smith’s Haystack model have shown that high rates of movement (i.e., migration, mixing, dispersal) undermine the evolution of cooperation. However, these models generally assume that movement is unconditional. The present model replaces the assumption of unconditional movement with conditional movement; individuals stay in groups that provide higher returns (by virtue of having more cooperators), and ‘Walk Away’ from groups providing low returns. Implementing this conditional movement rule generates a number of findings including: 1) when individuals have high thresholds, corresponding to low tolerance for defectors, this lead to selection for cooperation, 2) high thresholds lead to high rates of movement initially and lower rates of movement after selection for cooperators, and 3) population structure becomes more stable after selection increases the proportion of cooperators in the population. These findings challenge the standard view derived from Maynard Smith’s Haystack model and others that high rates of movement undermine selection for cooperation. In contrast, the current model demonstrates that high rates of conditional movement can be associated with stronger selection for cooperation. These results show that high rates of migration observed in nature are not prohibitive for the evolution of cooperation, as standard group selection models have assumed.
6 Views
12:40:04 06/04/09
Athena Aktipis (1), 5/27/2009
[LESS INFO] 6 VIEWS | ADDED 16:40:04 06/04/09
Models such as Maynard Smith’s Haystack model have shown that high rates of movement (i.e., migration, mixing, dispersal) undermine the evolution of cooperation. However, these models generally assume that movement is unconditional. The present model replaces the assumption of unconditional movement with conditional movement; individuals stay in groups that provide higher returns (by virtue of having more cooperators), and ‘Walk Away’ from groups providing low returns. Implementing this conditional movement rule generates a number of findings including: 1) when individuals have high thresholds, corresponding to low tolerance for defectors, this lead to selection for cooperation, 2) high thresholds lead to high rates of movement initially and lower rates of movement after selection for cooperators, and 3) population structure becomes more stable after selection increases the proportion of cooperators in the population. These findings challenge the standard view derived from Maynard Smith’s Haystack model and others that high rates of movement undermine selection for cooperation. In contrast, the current model demonstrates that high rates of conditional movement can be associated with stronger selection for cooperation. These results show that high rates of migration observed in nature are not prohibitive for the evolution of cooperation, as standard group selection models have assumed.
9 Views
12:08:43 05/22/09
Nina Jablonski (2), 5/20/2009
[LESS INFO] 9 VIEWS | ADDED 16:08:43 05/22/09
Humans are distinguished from other primates by being functionally hairless over most of their bodies. This condition evolved because hairlessness facilitated cooling of the body by sweating. The evaporative cooling made possible by sweating results in whole-body cooling of blood flowing in superficial vessels, and the maintenance of constant brain temperature. The combination of anatomical, physiological, and new genetic information pertaining to the structure and function human skin have helped to “lay bare” the evolution of human hairlessness and sweatiness. Hairlessness had major consequences for the evolution of skin pigmentation and the communication of visual information and signals through elaborated facial expressions and, later, body painting and decoration.
5 Views
12:02:56 05/22/09
Nina Jablonski (1), 5/20/2009
[LESS INFO] 5 VIEWS | ADDED 16:02:56 05/22/09
Humans are distinguished from other primates by being functionally hairless over most of their bodies. This condition evolved because hairlessness facilitated cooling of the body by sweating. The evaporative cooling made possible by sweating results in whole-body cooling of blood flowing in superficial vessels, and the maintenance of constant brain temperature. The combination of anatomical, physiological, and new genetic information pertaining to the structure and function human skin have helped to “lay bare” the evolution of human hairlessness and sweatiness. Hairlessness had major consequences for the evolution of skin pigmentation and the communication of visual information and signals through elaborated facial expressions and, later, body painting and decoration.
4 Views
11:51:34 05/22/09
Dan Geschwind (2), 5/18/2009
[LESS INFO] 4 VIEWS | ADDED 15:51:34 05/22/09
We are interested in understanding how genes influence human cognition and behavior, leading to unique human cognitive specializations, such as language. Advances in molecular and statistical genetics now allow us to identify genes that may be responsible for the emergence of some of these human cognitive features. But convergent approaches relying on data from several levels are necessary to understand a particular gene’s relationship to brain structure and function. To do this, we have undertaken a multidisciplinary approach involving the study of human diseases affecting these features, such as autism, as well as human brain evolution. We have begun to develop methods that try to take into account the systems level organization of gene expression (the transcriptome), and applied these to large scale data sets. This has revealed a previously unrecognized organization to the transcriptional program in brain, which provides a framework on which to understand adaptive changes in gene expression on the human lineage.
6 Views
16:23:19 05/21/09
Dan Geschwind (1), 5/18/2009
[LESS INFO] 6 VIEWS | ADDED 20:23:19 05/21/09
We are interested in understanding how genes influence human cognition and behavior, leading to unique human cognitive specializations, such as language. Advances in molecular and statistical genetics now allow us to identify genes that may be responsible for the emergence of some of these human cognitive features. But convergent approaches relying on data from several levels are necessary to understand a particular gene’s relationship to brain structure and function. To do this, we have undertaken a multidisciplinary approach involving the study of human diseases affecting these features, such as autism, as well as human brain evolution. We have begun to develop methods that try to take into account the systems level organization of gene expression (the transcriptome), and applied these to large scale data sets. This has revealed a previously unrecognized organization to the transcriptional program in brain, which provides a framework on which to understand adaptive changes in gene expression on the human lineage.
7 Views
13:01:37 05/12/09
Scott Johnson (1), 5/4/2009
[LESS INFO] 7 VIEWS | ADDED 17:01:37 05/12/09
Mental rotation (MR) is the process by which people imagine how an object would look when rotated into a different orientation in space; it may be related to performance on tasks like perspective-taking and navigation. Men typically perform faster and more accurately than women on MR tasks. Known influences on MR performance in adults are both biological (e.g., exposure to testosterone) and experiential (e.g., practice at spatial tasks), raising vital questions about the developmental origins of MR. Until recently, developmental studies were limited to children 4 years and older. This talk will present evidence that sex differences in MR performance are present far earlier, and can be observed in preverbal infants. I will also discuss the influence of task demands on MR in infants, and the possible biological and environmental contributions to performance that may shed light on the intersection of visual/motor skills and mental imagery of 3D objects early in life.
7 Views
13:07:39 05/01/09
Paul Mellars (2), 4/29/09
[LESS INFO] 7 VIEWS | ADDED 17:07:39 05/01/09
Research over the past ten years in both DNA studies and archaeology has provided some remarkable new insights into the origins of biologically and behaviourally modern human populations, and their widespread dispersal from Africa to the rest of the world around 60,000 years ago. The combination of DNA studies and recent finds of skeletal remains show that essentially 'modern' humans had emerged in Africa by at least 150-200,000 years ago, and subsequently spread from Africa into both Asia and Europe around 55-60,000 years ago, where they rapidly replaced the pre-existing "archaic" populations (including the Eurasian Neanderthals) within a matter of a few thousand years. This talk will focus specifically on the patterns of dispersal of biologically and behaviourally modern humans from Africa, and the nature of the cultural and behavioural adaptations which made this dispersal possible. The aim will be to compare and integrate evidence from both genetic (i.e. DNA) studies and the recent spate of new archaeological discoveries in Africa and elsewhere. The talk will focus on the two questions of (a) why there was a delay of around 100,000 years between the initial emergence of modern Homo sapiens in Africa and their subsequent dispersal to the rest of the world; and (b) what range of behavioural innovations and adaptations allowed the widespread geographical dispersal of modern humans into a range of new and sharply contrasting environments, and the rapid replacement of the pre-existing 'archaic' populations in these regions, within such a short space of time. How far these behavioural innovations can be attributed to a major neurological change, and how far to simple cumulative 'feedback' processes of technological, social and other behavioural changes remains a central and critical question for future research.
8 Views
13:16:22 04/16/09
Naomi Eisenberger (2), 4/13/09
[LESS INFO] 8 VIEWS | ADDED 17:16:22 04/16/09
Numerous languages characterize ‘social pain,’ the feelings resulting from social rejection or loss, with words typically reserved for describing physical pain (“ broken hearts,” “ hurt feelings”) and perhaps for good reason. It has been suggested that, in mammalian species, the social attachment system borrowed the computations of the physical pain system in order to prevent the potentially harmful consequences of social separation. In this talk, I will use a combination of behavioral and neuroimaging methodologies to explore the notion that physical and social pain rely on overlapping neural and experiential processes. Specifically, I will examine: 1) whether social pain activates pain-related neural circuitry, 2) whether individual differences in sensitivity to one kind of pain relate to individual differences in sensitivity to the other ( e.g. Are individuals who are more sensitive to physical pain also more sensitive to social pain?) , and 3) whether factors that up- or down-regulate one type of pain affect the other in a similar manner ( e.g., Can physical painkillers reduce social pain?).
5 Views
13:11:04 04/16/09
Naomi Eisenberger (1), 4/13/09
[LESS INFO] 5 VIEWS | ADDED 17:11:04 04/16/09
Numerous languages characterize ‘social pain,’ the feelings resulting from social rejection or loss, with words typically reserved for describing physical pain (“ broken hearts,” “ hurt feelings”) and perhaps for good reason. It has been suggested that, in mammalian species, the social attachment system borrowed the computations of the physical pain system in order to prevent the potentially harmful consequences of social separation. In this talk, I will use a combination of behavioral and neuroimaging methodologies to explore the notion that physical and social pain rely on overlapping neural and experiential processes. Specifically, I will examine: 1) whether social pain activates pain-related neural circuitry, 2) whether individual differences in sensitivity to one kind of pain relate to individual differences in sensitivity to the other ( e.g. Are individuals who are more sensitive to physical pain also more sensitive to social pain?) , and 3) whether factors that up- or down-regulate one type of pain affect the other in a similar manner ( e.g., Can physical painkillers reduce social pain?).
1 Views
13:12:24 04/09/09
Joe Henrich (1), 4/6/2009
[LESS INFO] 1 VIEWS | ADDED 17:12:24 04/09/09
This talk will first develop an evolutionarily-informed, cognitively-grounded approach to culture, and then apply this approach to explain patterns of food taboos for pregnant and lactating women on Yasawa Island, Fiji. Within a broader cognitive framework, I focus on (1) understanding our capacities for cultural learning as evolved cognitive mechanisms for acquiring adaptive information from other individuals, in a complex, noisy, and changing world, and (2) examining how and when these learning mechanisms result in cumulative cultural evolutionary processes that produce population-level patterns of adaptation and maladaptation. Then, applying this framework, I will argue that the patterns of food taboos observed across three villages in Fiji represent a culturally-evolved adaptation, influenced by various cognitive biases, that protects women, fetuses, and infants from dangerous marine toxins. Our findings indicate that these patterns likely emerged, and are now maintained, by the operation of the cultural learning mechanisms predicted by our evolutionary approach to cognition.
1 Views
12:55:50 04/09/09
Joe Henrich (2), 4/6/2009
[LESS INFO] 1 VIEWS | ADDED 16:55:50 04/09/09
This talk will first develop an evolutionarily-informed, cognitively-grounded approach to culture, and then apply this approach to explain patterns of food taboos for pregnant and lactating women on Yasawa Island, Fiji. Within a broader cognitive framework, I focus on (1) understanding our capacities for cultural learning as evolved cognitive mechanisms for acquiring adaptive information from other individuals, in a complex, noisy, and changing world, and (2) examining how and when these learning mechanisms result in cumulative cultural evolutionary processes that produce population-level patterns of adaptation and maladaptation. Then, applying this framework, I will argue that the patterns of food taboos observed across three villages in Fiji represent a culturally-evolved adaptation, influenced by various cognitive biases, that protects women, fetuses, and infants from dangerous marine toxins. Our findings indicate that these patterns likely emerged, and are now maintained, by the operation of the cultural learning mechanisms predicted by our evolutionary approach to cognition.
2 Views
14:51:48 03/09/09
Daniel Nettle (2), 2/23/2009
[LESS INFO] 2 VIEWS | ADDED 18:51:48 03/09/09
Even in the most developed countries, many people do not accept the theory of evolution as true. Whilst there are cultural and ideological reasons for this, part of the issue is that evolutionary ideas appear to violate certain intuitive beliefs. Even more interestingly, recent research has shown that students who do accept evolution quite systematically misunderstand how it works, tending to endorse species selectionism, the idea that species are born and die abruptly, and models of heredity in which useful characteristics are acquired by all members of the species, not just the progeny of the individuals in which they arise. I will argue that all of these errors arise because in our intuitive cognition about animals, there is little distinction between the species and the individual. Indeed, species are seen as a kind of individual, and individual animals are seen as appearances of the underlying species. This leads people into what Ernst Mayr called typological, rather than population, thinking. I report results of a recent study of conceptualisation of evolutionary change amongst undergraduate students, and argue that a good way of conveying evolutionary ideas is by using human examples, since our intuitive cognition about humans primarily works at the level of individuals, their family relationships, and the ways they are different from other members of their species.
2 Views
14:45:07 03/09/09
Daniel Nettle (1), 2/23/2009
[LESS INFO] 2 VIEWS | ADDED 18:45:07 03/09/09
Even in the most developed countries, many people do not accept the theory of evolution as true. Whilst there are cultural and ideological reasons for this, part of the issue is that evolutionary ideas appear to violate certain intuitive beliefs. Even more interestingly, recent research has shown that students who do accept evolution quite systematically misunderstand how it works, tending to endorse species selectionism, the idea that species are born and die abruptly, and models of heredity in which useful characteristics are acquired by all members of the species, not just the progeny of the individuals in which they arise. I will argue that all of these errors arise because in our intuitive cognition about animals, there is little distinction between the species and the individual. Indeed, species are seen as a kind of individual, and individual animals are seen as appearances of the underlying species. This leads people into what Ernst Mayr called typological, rather than population, thinking. I report results of a recent study of conceptualisation of evolutionary change amongst undergraduate students, and argue that a good way of conveying evolutionary ideas is by using human examples, since our intuitive cognition about humans primarily works at the level of individuals, their family relationships, and the ways they are different from other members of their species.